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Abstract—The mobile application market is rapidly growing and changing, offering always brand new software to install in increasingly
powerful devices. Mobile devices become pervasive and more heterogeneous, embedding latest technologies such as multicore
architectures, special-purpose circuits and reconfigurable logic. In a future mobile market scenario reconfigurable systems are
employed to provide high-speed functionalities to assist execution of applications. However, new security concerns are introduced. In
particular, protecting the Intellectual Property of the exchanged soft IP cores is a serious concern. The available techniques for
preserving integrity, confidentiality and authenticity suffer from the limitation of heavily relying onto the system designer. In this paper
we propose two different protocols suitable for the secure deployment of soft IP cores in FPGA-based mobile heterogeneous systems
where multiple independent actors are involved: a simple scenario requiring trust relationship between entities, and a more complex
scenario where no trust relationship exists through adoption of the Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol. Finally, we provide a
prototype implementation of the proposed architectures.
Index Terms—FPGA, Bitstream confidentiality, Bitstream deployment, Bitstream security, Direct Anonymous Attestation,
Heterogeneous systems, Hardware security
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The current mobile application market is constantly chang-
ing due to the presence of new devices and platforms which
emerge quite frequently [1]. The changes affect the business
environment creating a demand but also an opportunity
for the rapid introduction of new technological solutions.
Players in the growing business landscape cannot ignore
this opportunity, since mobile technology will eventually
have a role in most digital products and services.
Several well-known companies participate in this sce-
nario: the first to define the market was Apple which
launched, in 2007, the iPhone and later, in 2008, its dis-
tribution platform App Store. Subsequently, other players
and device manufacturers joined the mobile application
market with their devices, operating systems and software
distribution platforms. Currently, the distribution of mobile
applications spans over 300 application stores worldwide,
including device manufacturers, platform providers, mo-
bile operators. Well-known examples are Google Play Store
(previously known as Android Market), Apple App Store,
Windows Phone Store, Opera Mobile Store, etc. [2]. Sales,
finalized through a payment gateway, and downloads of
mobile apps are skyrocketing too. According to a recent
survey by iResearch, in 2018, global mobile app revenues
amounted to over 365 billion U.S. dollars. In 2023, mobile
apps are projected to generate more than 935 billion U.S.
dollars in revenues via paid downloads from app stores and
in-app advertising [3].
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Several motivations are at the base of the continuous
growth of this phenomenon. Certainly, the hardware im-
provement is the key factor that keeps pushing applica-
tions toward new levels of pervasiveness, which allows an
ever increasing computational power of mobile platforms.
Second, heterogeneous computing has been the leading
technology that allowed moving towards new generations
of mobile devices. For example, combining multi-core pro-
cessors with Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) and other
types of hardware accelerators is having a huge impact on
device performance. Therefore, System-on-Chip developers
are increasingly looking at alternative architectural solutions
to increase the computational power, while optimizing ad-
ditional parameters such as power consumption.
In this landscape, reconfigurable computing is a promis-
ing solution. As shown in [4], [5], programmable sys-
tem platforms embedding Field-Programmable Gate-Arrays
(FPGAs) might be a valuable solution where frequent and
remote upgrades are necessary, thus also for embedded
applications. Moreover, some FPGA-based systems provide
Dynamic Partial Re-configuration (DPR), which allows the
run-time update of selected portions of an FPGA without
disrupting the rest of the system. DPR allows the creation
of new application scenarios [6], [7], [8] and it has already
been used in the mobile application market [9], [10], [11].
Hardware vendors are responsible for manufacturing the
FPGA devices and sell them to their customers or retailers.
In FPGAs it is possible to (re)configure logic resources by
controlling the interconnection among different logic gates.
The hardware logic blocks implementing specific functions
compose an Intellectual Property (IP) soft IP core. A soft
IP core is an independent and reusable module that can be
instantiated in the reconfigurable fabric. One or more soft
IP cores are described by a bitstream file, which configures
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2the FPGA (or just a portion, if DPR is supported). The
project of a soft IP core is defined by the system designer.
The exploitation of reconfigurable hardware enables a new
mobile application scenario, where a reconfigurable device
can be programmed at run-time to assist the execution
of a software application by means of application-specific
computational cores. The applications can employ hard-
ware capabilities on-demand using ad-hoc computational
resources optimized for the various system’s aspects (e.g.,
power consumption of the whole system). Mobile applica-
tions like games, audio/video processing, secure commu-
nications are good candidates to benefit from providing
application-specific hardware acceleration cores deployed
together with the software application.
However, this new application paradigm opens up con-
cerns in the security domain. As an example, an adversary
that is able to intercept a bitstream of an hardware Intellec-
tual Property can try to extract sensitive information or steal
the property, thus leading to IP infringements. Also disclo-
sure to the public domain or unauthorized sales to earn un-
fair profit are possible, thus violating the confidentiality of
the hardware block. Considering the hardware, an attacker
may also produce intentional alterations to the hardware
block by injecting malicious code that may either corrupt the
correct behavior of the software application or compromise
the whole end-users system, e.g., by introducing security
flaws which could later be exploited.
Therefore, the hardware description of soft IP cores
should never be sent across unprotected network links.
FPGA manufacturers have already provided techniques,
such as bitstream encryption and authentication, which try
to address these issues. Indeed, they fit a simple scenario
where the application developer and designer is the only
entity entrusted to produce reconfigurable hardware de-
scriptions to be delivered to a remote system. Certainly,
they don’t fit the current very dynamic and heterogeneous
scenario of the mobile application market. Moreover, these
methods may require an excessive involvement and trust
in the manufacturers, which usually embed secrets in their
hardware that can eventually be exploited. Even worse, it
requires to trust the whole manufacturers’ supply chain as
well, which has become an issue with the delocalization of
the production.
In this work, we tackle a much more challenging and
realistic situation that involves several independent parties
participating in the development and distribution of appli-
cations to be executed on heterogeneous mobile platforms
embedding an FPGA as reconfigurable hardware. These
parties include: the end users, the application stores, the
software providers and the reconfigurable hardware ven-
dors. In this scenario, a single reconfigurable hardware
resource can be shared by several applications from different
vendors with guarantees on the integrity and confidentiality
of the provided hardware cores.
This paper extends a preliminary published work by
adding tightening security requirements and developing
a more complex scenario that avoids trust relationships
among the involved entities [12].
This paper addresses the security threats introduced by
two types of adversaries: (i) remote adversaries acting on the
communication channels between the application providers
and the devices (Man-in-the-Middle), and (ii) local adver-
saries with physical access to the system (Man-at-the-End).
We describe the security services for the envisioned
infrastructure by taking into account three aspects: (i) the
hardware resources and the system architecture to imple-
ment the required security primitives, (ii) the high-level
software infrastructure needed to implement the required
communication protocols, and (iii) the high-level entrusting
policies required among the involved entities.
Instead of resorting to ad-hoc technology to tackle the
adversaries and the security issues, we exploit the idea of
another mainstream initiative, i.e., the Direct Anonymous
Attestation (DAA) protocol [13]. Currently, the DAA pro-
tocol has been standardized by the Trusted Computing
Group (TCG) [14] and it is supported in ad-hoc chips like
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Even if we do not
necessarily propose the use of TCG-specified TPM chips, we
follow the progresses in this field employing reconfigurable
hardware to achieve the same features. This also means
that there will be more people researching for flaws, as the
impact of attacks becomes greater thus also the impact of
publication of such attacks is more likely to reach a higher
visibility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 defines the assumptions and the security require-
ments to be satisfied, as well as the roles of the actors
playing in the two scenarios here considered. Section 3
provides an overview of the previous works carried out in
the perspective of the security requirements. In Section 4, we
detail the protocol to securely transfer the bitstream. We dis-
cuss, in Section 5, the internal architecture of the employed
device, providing details for the software implementation of
the considered players. In Section 6, we analyze the security
of the protocols considering their security requirements
against possible attacks. Finally, Section 7, concludes the
paper.
2 ASSUMPTIONS, MODELS AND REQUIREMENTS
This section presents our model by describing the involved
actors and the security and functional requirements to be
satisfied. Moreover, it characterizes the two scenarios we
assume in this paper, which depict very common situations
for the deployment of mobile applications.
The application is the object to be securely exchanged
among all involved parties. As shown in Fig. 1, in this paper
we consider applications composed of two portions: (i) the
executable code (SW), and (ii) an FPGA Bitstream file (BS).
The application is executed on the End User Device,
which embeds a general purpose CPU executing the SW
and a FPGA-based Hardware Acceleration Platform (HAP).
HAP contains the reconfigurable logic, i.e., the FPGA, and a
microcontroller used to securely load and store a bitstream.
The bitstream describes one or more soft IP cores that
complement the application (e.g., required to improve its
performance). These soft IP cores are dynamically config-
ured in the FPGA every time the application is executed.
2.1 Actors
We model the considered scenarios following a common
scheme for application deployment for the mobile applica-
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Fig. 1. Mobile application paradigm considered mapped onto the (sim-
plified) architecture of the End User Device
tion market. The actors and their high-level interactions are
shown in Fig. 2.
We consider three main types of actors: (i) the software
providers, (ii) the hardware vendors, and (iii) the end users.
The Software Provider (SWP) is the entity that devel-
ops applications and sells them through several Application
Stores (STORE) to reach a high number of potential cus-
tomers.
The Hardware Vendor (HWV) is the entity responsi-
ble for designing and selling the Hardware Acceleration
Platform (HAP) used by the applications to load the BS
and it implements the soft IP cores developed and sold
by SWPs. The Hardware Acceleration Platforms considered
in this paper are microprocessor-based Systems on Chips
(SoCs) embedding state-of-the-art FPGAs featuring DPR
and bitstream encryption mechanisms. The HWV has full
knowledge of the hardware it produces, including secrets
and security mechanisms it embeds (e.g., cryptographic
keys). We assume that each hardware vendor has a publicly
accessible service (e.g., a web server) used to offer services
to the software providers and to the end users (e.g., prove
hardware product authenticity, send firmware updates, etc.).
It also provides publicly available information (e.g., list of
hardware capabilities, APIs, list of known compromised
devices).
The End User (EU) is the customer. The EU may be
interested in buying applications that have been developed
by different SWPs. He/she owns an End User Device (e.g.,
smartphones, tablets, PDAs, etc.) that embeds the HAP.
The End User Device and HAP are two separate execution
environments, therefore, they are considered as two sepa-
rate entities in our scenarios. However, the HAP does not
directly access the network, all communications with the
external world are mediated by the End User Device.
Together with the above three main actors, two more
players are involved in the scenario we have considered in
this paper. The STORE acts as an interface between EUs
and SWPs by collecting and making available to the EUs
software applications developed by different SWPs. Every
STORE has a publicly accessible service (e.g., a web server)
and is connected to one or many payment gateways to allow
customers to buy the software they want to purchase. Each
STORE knows the identity of its users.
Finally, the Payment Gateway (PG) offers payment ser-
vices for software application purchases (e.g., using credit
cards), interfacing with SWPs and with EUs.
2.2 Security requirements
The high-level security objective of an SWP is to preserve its
intellectual property. Moreover, an SWP aims at securing its
applications, by preserving their authenticity, integrity and
confidentiality. The EUs require to only execute authentic
versions of the software they have bought.
We solely consider the security aspects of the hard-
ware cores, while ensuring authenticity and integrity of
executable code is out of the scope of this paper. Interested
readers may refer to the literature on this field for a bet-
ter understanding of available methodologies for software
protection [15], [16], [17], [18].
The security requirements to be fulfilled in order to
guarantee the authenticity and the intellectual property of
all hardware cores deployed are the following ones:
• Bitstream confidentiality: no other players but the SWP
itself must be able to read a bitstream in an intelli-
gible form (e.g., if the application bitstream files are
encrypted, the bitstream should not be available in
plaintext). Every SWP does not trust neither other
SWPs nor the Applications Stores used for distribut-
ing applications. Moreover, the SWP does not trust
the EUs, even those who have legitimately bought its
application.
We have considered two scenarios in this paper. The
first one (named Simple Scenario and presented in
Section 4.1) considers a case where a trust relationship
exists between the SWP and the HWVs (i.e., HWVs
might read the bitstream in plaintext) because of le-
gal contracts or Non Disclosure Agreements (NDAs).
The second scenario, which tighten the confidentiality
(named Full Scenario and presented in Section 4.2), re-
laxes this assumption, avoiding every trust relationship
among all the parties involved.
• Bitstream integrity and authenticity: corrupted bitstream
files must not be delivered to the EUs, or used to con-
figure the FPGA. The types of corruption to avoid are
both accidental (e.g., transmission errors) and deriving
from intentional malicious alterations. Moreover, the
EUs must be ensured that the bitstream files they are
loading in their HAP are genuine, that is, they have
actually been developed by the SWP.
• Legitimate End User: only users who bought a legitimate
copy of the software must be able to use the related
bitstream files to configure the FPGA available in the
HAP to assist the execution of the related software
application. Nevertheless, in no case end users are
allowed to access the bitstream in plaintext.
• Legitimate HAP: only owners of legitimate HAP can run
applications into a user platform and load a BS into the
FPGA.
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Fig. 2. Actors involved in our scenarios showing a common mobile application deployment flow
• Need-to-know restrictions: only the parties that actually
need a sensitive information must have access to it. This
is of great importance especially for information con-
cerning the EUs (e.g., the applications that they buy).
This requirement is related to the privacy, however the
need-to-know is subjective, thus it cannot be considered
a privacy statement.
If any of these requirements is not met, the security of a
bitstream is undermined and an adversary would be able
to either read the bitstream and start reverse engineering or
compromise the bitstream authenticity and integrity to inject
malicious features, e.g., by opening security backdoors.
2.3 Attack model
We consider two type of attacks: IP attacks and integrity
attacks.
When a IP attack is performed, an adversary tries to get
access to an intelligible version of a bitstream. This attacks
can be performed either on the HAP by tampering with
external memory devices or over the network links the
application traverses during their deployment. This type of
attack aims at violating the confidentiality of the bitstream
in order to make illegal copies of the soft IP cores.
When an integrity attack is performed, an adversary tries
to compromise the integrity of a bitstream. This type of
attack has two motivations: (1) a remote adversary may
want to compromise the bitstream integrity to prevent the
correct execution of the related software application (Denial
of Service), (2) a malicious user may want to replace a
bitstream file with a previous version (downgrade), for
example to avoid security updates.
In this paper we do not consider physical attacks that
aim at damaging the HAP or make it not operable (i.e.,
hardware Denial Of Service attacks).
2.4 Adversary model and security assumptions
The attacks just described can be carried out by a malicious
attacker. We consider two types of adversaries trying to
break the requirements introduced in Section 2.2; remote
and local adversaries. We assume that both local and re-
mote adversaries are knowledgeable attackers. They have
considerable knowledge of the system and device they are
attacking and they own high technical skills. Moreover,
they have access to sophisticated tools and instruments [19].
Nonetheless, they are associated to different threat models.
A remote adversary controls every possible network link
involved in the proposed scenarios, i.e., he/she can perform
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks. A Remote adversary
uses techniques to intercept and understand the content of
the messages exchanged between two arbitrary networking
nodes. Once the attacker modifies the flow of messages, he
can also make changes, delete and create completely new
fake messages impersonating one of the communicating
parties.
A local adversary is a malicious EU who has physical
access to and full control of a End User Device. That is,
he/she can perform Man-At-The-End (MATE) attacks. Local
adversaries have no restriction on the tools and techniques
to reverse-engineer and then to tamper with the application
(e.g., debuggers, emulators). Thus the application cannot
be trusted to store/embed secret data or routines. System
libraries and general purpose libraries could be controlled
by local adversaries, along with the operating system. In
this case, to reach their goals attackers can use and alter sys-
tem calls, the input/output subsystem, the network stack,
the memory management subsystem and possibly others
techniques. Therefore, the communication with the HAP
mediated by software and drivers can be compromised by
these adversaries, thus the data exchanged can be altered
even if they are transmitted via secure channels that are
safe against MITM attacks. The attacker also controls the
platform hardware. Every memory location can be read and
written, including the processor registers. The attacker also
controls the program storage medium, as a consequence he
can read and change any of the stored bits at any time. This
means that nothing can be considered secure in the user’s
environment.
The only part of the user’s platform that we will consider
secure is the HAP, the stored information and the routines
executed within the HAP are considered confidential. In-
deed, we assume that, even if the HAP may be placed in
an hostile environment, the reconfigurable hardware and
the security blocks surrounding it are resistant to physical
attacks (e.g., decamping the chip, side-channel attacks, etc.).
Finally, we assume that the local adversaries have no
interest in performing Denial of Service attacks against their
platforms and including HAP (e.g., by repeatedly sending
invalid bitstreams to block its functioning).
Competing firms are potential local adversaries, since
they can invest non-negligible resources trying to compro-
5mise the security requirements.
Moreover, we assume that attackers all work under the
infeasibility hypothesis. The infeasibility is associated to the
derived computational cost, impossible to sustain for an at-
tacker, in order to decipher the secret information needed by
cryptographic algorithms or to invert digest algorithms. In
practice, attackers are unable to solve exponential problems
of proper size in useful time.
Eventually, when we state that two peers communicate
with a k-secure channel, we indicate that the peers perform
strong authentication and agree on a symmetric key k that
can then be used with data integrity and authentication
algorithms and symmetric encryption algorithms to secure
the exchanged data.
3 RELATED WORKS
Security concerns from the previously introduced model of
software distribution are considered in this section. A gen-
eral overview of the feasible attacks against FPGAs, as well
as a description of security issues and open problems re-
garding system security of FPGAs is provided by Wollinger
et al. in [20]. Security features, such as anti-tampering and
data protection techniques, are described in [21]. In [22], the
authors define an FPGA threat model and evaluate how the
security features offered by most FPGA vendors address the
threats.
3.1 Bitstream Confidentiality
Guaranteeing bitstream confidentiality implies to protect
from eavesdropping performed by external sources such
as attackers or competitors. In this way, the information
exchanged has to be maintained secure in the sense that
it is not disclosed to unauthorized third parties. To maintain
the confidentiality it is sufficient to encrypt the data.
Nowadays, bitstream confidentiality can be achieved
resorting to the integrated bitstream encryption mechanisms
offered by most FPGA manufacturers. These techniques
allow to assist system designers in the protection of the
secrecy of their IP cores, preventing the product to be cloned
or reverse engineered.
The bitstream encryption operation is based on symmet-
ric cryptography, i.e., the key used to encrypt the informa-
tion is the same used during the decryption. The encryption
key is generated by the system designer at design time and
stored inside the FPGA. The device decrypts the incoming
bitstream during the configuration phase. The FPGA stores
the encryption key internally in a devoted memory, which
could be backed-up by a battery (e.g., BBRAM - Battery
backed RAM) in order to maintain its content or a non-
volatile one-time-programmable memory. The memory stor-
ing the key is designed to prevent physical attacks. How-
ever, the encrypted bitstream configures the entire device.
To decrypt partial bitstreams, system designers should build
their own decryption engine requiring additional logic, thus
reducing the usable area.
Bitstream encryption is an effective solution to protect
designer’s IP against cloning or reverse engineering and
IP disclosure [23]. However, in some cases encryption may
not provide sufficient security, as reported in [24], [25].
Another approach to protect IP cores against piracy and
reverse engineering can be obtained through obfuscation.
The authors of [26] leverage FPGA dark silicon to obfuscate
the functionality of the design. Other works discuss tech-
niques to consider for bitstream confidentiality as well as
authentication [27], [28].
3.2 Bitstream Integrity and Authenticity
Since encryption alone does not protect the bitstream from
modifications, integrity aims to ensure that the data ex-
changed does not undergo to modifications carried by unau-
thorized third parties across the network links during the
transfer. Moreover, it provides assurance also from unin-
tended modifications that might corrupt the data due to
errors, e.g., transmission errors. If the integrity is main-
tained, also the system receiving the bitstream preserves its
integrity.
Error control against data corruption can be accom-
plished with error-detection techniques, such as checksums
and Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC). To confirm that the
configuration data stored in an FPGA device is correct, most
vendors offer dedicated hardware for CRC features. How-
ever, CRCs are not suitable to protect against intentional
malicious alteration of data [29] since employ reversible
functions. Moreover, they are vulnerable to collision attacks,
thus they do not guarantee adequate security levels.
Hashing is another method commonly used to validate
the integrity of information using a one-way function, i.e.,
infeasible to invert. The fixed-length output of a crypto-
graphic hash function, called message digest or simply hash,
can be thought of as the fingerprint of the input bitstream,
offering strong collision resistance. Cryptographic hashing
primitives have been employed in [27], [30], [31]. Message
digest, however, does not authenticate the source. To verify
the origin of the bitstream, the secret key shared between
the vendor and the device can be combined together with
a cryptographic hash function to generate a Hash-based
Message Authentication Code (HMAC). In [31] different
authenticated encryption schemes have been evaluated and
the dual-pass Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) has been
identified as the best option by lowest area footprint. How-
ever, Dual-pass authenticated encryption algorithms sepa-
rate authentication and encryption procedures and therefore
require significant overhead. Usually, authentication and
confidentiality aspects are considered together, as proposed
in [27], [32].
In presence of DPR, specific solutions to security prob-
lems, as well as safety [8], have also been discussed in
literature. In [33] a flexible security system based on bit-
stream encryption is proposed. While using FPGAs DPR,
designers can freely choose encryption/decryption algo-
rithms implemented as reconfigurable modules. In [34] au-
thors developed a secure DPR system based on encryption
of partial bit-streams with AES-GCM cipher. AES-GCM is
an authenticated encryption cipher which guarantees both
the confidentiality and the authenticity of a message. In [35]
is shown an improvement of the security of DPR in FPGAs
re-encrypting a remotely received bitstream with a unique
random key, while providing low area overhead and a high
reconfiguration throughput.
63.3 IP Licensing and Activation
Providing confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of a
bitstream protects the end-user device from malicious at-
tackers. However, the intellectual property is left unshielded
from piracy, which could damage the related business
model of an application. IP theft introduces problems with
design rights associated to the soft IP cores. Encryption
and obfuscation are strong tools to ensure security, but
they cannot protect the IP in every stage of the life cycle.
Several works addresses these challenges [36], [37], [38].
Enforcing IP security can be achieved resorting to solutions
from a related area, i.e., trusted computing. In particular,
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a microcontroller
used to authenticate a target platform, enabling several
cryptographic features [39]. The TPM is embedded in and
interacts with the target platform, providing cryptographic
primitives for secure key generation and storage, random
number generation and remote attestation. In literature,
different methods of activation and licensing for IP cores
protection have been employed: in [40] a new scheme to
track and control the licensed designs is presented, adopting
public-key cryptograpy and symmetric encryption as well.
The authors of [41] propose an IP protection mechanism to
restrict IP execution only on specific FPGA devices, limiting
unauthorized copies and integration of the IPs. This solu-
tion, together with [37], enforces a pay-per-device licensing
scheme for system developers, instead of purchasing un-
limited IP licenses. Finally, a recent work [42] provides a
remote licensing and activation mechanism, guaranteeing
anonymity for the end users.
3.4 Open Challenges and contributions
The analyzed solutions bring several improvements related
to the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of a bit-
stream. However, the key employed for cryptographic op-
erations is defined at design time and it is a secret shared
between the system designer and the target device. The
system designer is therefore the only entity entrusted to
provide new or updated bitstreams for a specific device.
From this, it follows the limitation that software providers
cannot generate bitstreams to assist their applications with-
out relying onto the system designer. To the best of our
knowledge, the available solutions are unable to fit the
security requirements introduced in Section 2.
Our previous work proposed a simple architecture able
to overcome this limitation. However, as will be described
in Section 4.1, existing agreements between the software
providers and the hardware vendors are necessary. The
hardware vendors must be able to access the bitstream in
plaintext, requiring a trust relationship with the respective
software provider. This paper moves forward by presenting
a new scenario, described in Section 4.2, where the trust re-
lationship among every of the involved parties is no longer
required. Moreover, the users are able to gain additional
privacy, limiting the identity disclosure to only software
application stores.
In both cases, the confidentiality, integrity and authen-
ticity of the bitstream exchanged (whether it is a new
application or an update for an already-installed one) across
the network links is maintained.
4 PROTOCOLS AND SECURE INFORMATION EX-
CHANGE
This section introduces our solution for the secure reconfig-
urable computing model presented in Section 2. In particu-
lar, we will introduce and analyze the information exchange
and the required protocols that will be used to identify the
required hardware structures. Two cases will be analyzed:
1) a simple scenario fulfilling a reduced set of security
requirements but exploiting minimum hardware facili-
ties, and
2) a complex scenario featuring trusted computing hard-
ware fulfilling the full set of security requirements of
Section 2.
In both scenarios, the target of the protocol is to define
the operations to deploy a mobile application, composed
of the software and its hardware counterpart, on the End
User Device. However, the transfer among the involved
parties has to be secured with respect to the considerations
introduced in Section 2 and overcoming the limitations
discussed in Section 3.4.
4.1 Case 1: Simple Scenario
In this scenario, a simplified version of the protocol is
presented. This protocol satisfies a reduced set of security
requirements, but benefits from simplicity and reduced
hardware requirements.
Fig. 3 shows a possible workflow for the deployment
and execution of an application onto a device embedding
reconfigurable computing resources.
In this simple scenario, we assume that there is a trust
relationship between the SWP and the HWV. Moreover,
together with the security requirements and assumptions
presented in Section 2, the following realistic functional
assumptions are considered:
• The EU is able to access the store (i.e., he has an account
on the STORE);
• The EU has a credit card or any another equivalent
payment system compatible with the store;
• The STORE has existing agreements with one or more
payment systems;
• The HAP is identified by a unique code (e.g., serial
number), defined here as idHAP and stores a secret
cryptographic key (KHAP), both known by the HWV.
The key is not accessible from the outside of the HAP;
• all involved entities are able to create secure channels
(e.g., through SSL/TLS protocols) satisfying confiden-
tiality, data integrity and authentication, and peer au-
thentication using an agreed symmetric key;
• the SWP knows the HAP manufacturers (i.e., HWVs)
and can access to their services.
The following protocol presents the steps to be per-
formed in order to buy an application and securely obtain
the associated bitstream (see Fig. 3).
1) (The EU buys the application) The EU browses the
STORE and decides to buy a mobile application, one
that is composed by SW and BS, developed by a SWP.
As usual in the web market era, the STORE redirects
the user on the PG to complete the purchase. The PG
7HAP Host STORE SWP HWV
{rC , idFPGA,S,
H(rC , idFPGA,S)}KCS
rS , C,HKCS(rC , rS , C) {rS2, idFPGA,W,
H(rS2, idFPGA,W)}KSS
rW ,S,HKSS(rS2, rW ,S) {rW2,BS, idFPGA,H,
H(rW2,BS, idFPGA,H)}KSH
rH , {BS}KFPGA ,W,
HKSH(rW2, rH , {BS}KFPGA ,W)
rW3, {BS}KFPGA ,S,
HKSS(rW3, {BS}KFPGA ,S)
rS3,HKSS(rS3, rW3,W)rS4, {BS}KFPGA , C,
HKCS(rS4, {BS}KFPGA , C)
rC2, {BS}KFPGA ,S,
HKCS(rS4, rC2, {BS}KFPGA ,S)
verifyhash
load({BS}KFPGA)
OK/KO
Fig. 3. The simple case workflow for downloading a new application. The grey area shows messages exchanged locally in the End User Device,
i.e., between the host platform and the HAP.
notifies the STORE if the payment transaction termi-
nates successfully. The STORE starts the procedure
to obtain the requested BS to send to the client. The
actual steps performed may change depending on the
information exchanged between the STORE and the
PG, thus this is not reported in Fig. 3.
2) (The EU sends the STORE its data) The first interaction
reported in Fig. 3 involves the EU and the STORE.
The EU sends (from its device platform) the infor-
mation needed to identify its HAP, i.e., idHAP. Since
the communication involves sensitive data, the End
User Device and the STORE use a secure channel that
ensures confidentiality, data integrity and authentica-
tion by means of an agreed symmetric key KCS1. The
freshness is guaranteed by using a random number rC .
In Fig. 3, the symbols r indicate random numbers. The
STORE then sends back an acknowledgement to the
Client in the secure channel2.
3) (The STORE notifies the SWP) The second interaction
reports the STORE that notifies the SWP that a new
customer bought the application (thus also its BS). The
STORE forwards information about the HAP of the
1. To simplify the presentation, we indicate that KCS is used both
for symmetric encryption and to compute a Message Authentication
Code (MAC), even if KCS is better used as a master key to derive
different keys (as actually done by TLS). Also note that an authenticated
encryption primitive could have been used instead of a MAC.
2. The acknowledgments are sent to confirm the correct data receipt
after all the interactions. Nonetheless, they are not explicitly reported
in the text to ease the reading.
client who bought the software. Again, the commu-
nication involves sensitive data (the idHAP) thus the
STORE and the SWP communicate by using a secure
channel that ensures confidentiality, data integrity and
authentication by means of an agreed symmetric key
KSS .
4) (The SWP sends the BS to the HWV) The SWP sends
the BS of the purchased application and the idHAP that
bought it. Also in this case, the communication involves
sensitive data (BS, idHAP) thus the SWP and the HWV
communicate by using a secure channel that ensures
confidentiality, data integrity and authentication by
means of an agreed symmetric key KSH .
5) (The HWV prepares the BS for the client’s HAP) After
receiving the data, the HWV ciphers the BS with the
HAP key and sends back to SWP the ciphered bit-
stream {BS}KHAP . In this case, the confidentiality of the
secure channel is not needed, only the integrity and
authentication. However, the already established secure
channel could be used again.
6) (The SWP forwards the encrypted BS to the STORE) the
SWP sends back to the STORE the ciphered bitstream
{BS}KHAP via the available secure communication chan-
nel.
7) (The BS ready to be downloaded by the EU from the
STORE) Finally, the STORE makes available to the
EU, e.g., through the user account, both the executable
code SW and the ciphered bitstream {BS}KHAP .
The EU is then ready to install the application on its
8device. After the installation, every time the user starts the
application the reconfiguration of the HAP will be triggered.
Within the HAP the BS will be decrypted, thanks to the
embedded controller that uses the HAP key KHAP, and
loaded onto the reconfigurable logic.
It is worth noting that the proposed infrastructure can
also be used to deliver updates to the BS, while updates
to the executable code can simply be downloaded by the
STORE through the usual methods. When the SWP up-
dates the BS, e.g., because of a new version release or bug
fixes, a reduced version of the previous protocol can be used:
1) the current version of the application initiates the com-
munication with SWP to check for available updates.
2) If a new update is available, the client sends its idHAP to
the SWP (thus bypassing the STORE) through a secure
channel that ensures confidentiality, data integrity and
authentication by means of an agreed symmetric key
KCS . The SWP checks if the client corresponds to a
valid customer3.
3) The SWP connects to the HWV via a secure channel
and sends to the HWV the BS and the idHAP, encrypted
with an agreed symmetric key KSH ;
4) The HWV ciphers the BS using the HAP key KHAP,
and sends back to the SWP the ciphered bitstream
{BS}KHAP . In this case, a secure channel is not needed
however, the already established can be used;
5) finally, the SWP sends back to the EU the updated
application, which includes the updated ciphered bit-
stream {BS}KHAP .
Note that the simple scenario describes a communication
protocol for the exchange of the bitstream among several
parties that can be easily implemented with network nodes
and a suitable End User Device.
4.2 Case 2: Advanced scenario
The simple scenario presented in Section 4.1 ensures con-
fidentiality, data integrity and authentication among the
involved parties. However, it requires a trust relationship
between the SWP and the HWV, which might already exists
due to legal contracts. Nonetheless, it may be a limitation.
Moreover, this protocol does not minimize the disseminated
information. For instance, the HWV is aware of each BS
application the EU purchases.
In the simple scenario, the EU is able to obtain an
application for its device, while the SWP achieves a secure
transfer of its IP. However, there is no assurance for the
SWP that its IP will not be loaded and executed in compro-
mised hardware, which could ease the porting of attacks.
Additionally, the EU privacy could be undermined (and the
“need to know” requirement as well), since the other parties
may collect information about the software bought by the
user from any developer. Instead, in the scenario presented
here, either the EU is able to preserve anonymity and the
SWP may only sell his application to users that own le-
gitimate hardware. On the one hand, the full scenario drops
the assumption that there exists a trust relationship between
the SWP and the HWV. On the other hand, it requires that
3. This check implies that the SWP has stored the list of idHAP of
customers sent by the STORE.
the HAP offers more sophisticated features that are usually
available at dedicated secure hardware. Indeed, the protocol
implemented in the full scenario relies on the execution
of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol to
guarantee all the security requirements in Section 2.2.
4.2.1 The DAA Protocol
The Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol has been de-
signed to allow a verifier to check that a signature has been
originated by a legitimate platform by means of a deter-
ministic verification algorithm [13]. Signatures can be used
to convince a verifier about the integrity of the platform,
that is, signatures allow achieving platform attestation. Sig-
natures made with the DAA protocol are anonymous, that
is, they do not leak any information about the signer, unless
the signer wants a subset of signatures to be linked. By using
the DAA protocol it is also possible to detect the so-called
rogue platforms, so that the signatures obtained by means of
compromised keys can be revoked. The manufacturer of the
secure chips providing the DAA protocol can thus maintain
a list of the compromised platforms.
The DAA protocol is independent of the public key
authentication schemes, thus, different types of keys can be
embedded in the secure hardware platform.
Different versions of the DAA protocol have been pre-
sented in the last years since the publication of the first
version. Some of them were provably secure under assump-
tions that do not guarantee the claimed security properties
in the real world, for some other schemes, there exist known
attacks to compromise them [43], [44], [45], [46]. However,
recently, two forms of DAA have been presented that have
been formally proved against threats models that are not
considered weak [47], [48].
The DAA protocol has been standardized by the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) and is available in the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) since the version 1.24. Later, in 2013,
the TPM v2.0 has been developed and provided with the
most efficient of the published DAA protocol versions. The
same version of the DAA protocol has also been inserted
in the Intel processors as Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)
algorithm, which has been standardized as ISO/IEC 20008-
1:20135 and 20009-1:20136.
Three roles are involved in the execution of the DAA
protocol:
1) the DAA Issuer is the entity that manufactures the
secure hardware platform. The DAA Issuer knows all
the secrets the secure hardware platform stores.
2) The DAA Signer is the secure hardware platform that
produces the signatures used for attestation purposes.
The DAA Signer entity is composed of two parts, the
secure hardware platform and a Host, the set of all
the software components that interfaces with the secure
hardware platform (e.g., the computer system where
the secure hardware platform is available, including
the OS and all the drivers that allow accessing the
hardware). Finally,
4. However, the version of the DAA protocol implemented in the
TPM v1.2 is no longer considered secure.
5. https://www.iso.org/standard/57018.html
6. https://www.iso.org/standard/57079.html
93) the DAA Verifier is any external party (e.g., a service
provider) that is interested in verifying the integrity of
the secure hardware platform.
To achieve signature anonymity, the DAA protocol intro-
duces two more features:
• a counter, which is a value used to generate multiple
DAA keys from a single secret, and
• the basename: an optional value used to allow verifiers
to link multiple DAA signatures signed under the same
DAA key. Basenames can be considered pseudonyms
and are obtained by means of a secure function com-
puted on the secret of the secure hardware platform.
To abstract from the DAA protocol implementations
(and their present and future flaws) and to make our result
more general, we assume in this paper that the system uses
the most secure and efficient DAA protocol version, which
will expose the primitives presented below.
• The DAA Setup is the procedure that a secure hardware
platform performs to indicate its host and then to the
DAA Issuer whether or not it is corrupted.
• The DAA Join is the procedure that a host performs, to-
gether with the secure hardware platform, to obtain the
DAA Credentials (which can be seen as an anonymous
public key certificate) and becomes part of the group of
certified or attested secure hardware platforms.
• The DAA Sign/DAA Verify are the two procedures
that the secure hardware platform and the host use to
convince a verifier that the secure hardware platform is
certified and the host has previously joined the group.
These signatures are generated from a DAA Credential
obtained after the join. This procedure is a form of
remote attestation. Nevertheless, the same primitives
could also be used to actually sign messages.
The DAA protocol ensures several security properties.
They have been formally defined in previous works [47],
[48] and are reported in this paper in an informal way:
• Completeness: signatures from a valid basename of a
honest platforms are accepted as valid by the verifiers.
• Correctness of Link: signatures created with the same
basename by the same honest platform are correctly
linked.
• Unforgeability: no adversary can create a signature that
is recognized by the verifiers as a valid signature of a
honest platform, regardless of the basename he used.
• Anonymity: signatures of the same honest platform that
use different basenames (or no basename at all) are not
linked by any adversary. In other words, the adversary
cannot tell if they are applied by the same honest
platforms o by different honest platforms.
• Non-frameability: no adversary can create signatures
with a given basename that links to a signature created
by an honest platform.
4.2.2 Functional assumptions for the advanced scenario
The following functional assumptions have been considered
for the full scenario:
• The EU is able to access the store (i.e., has an account
on the STORE);
• The EU has a credit card or any another equivalent
payment system accepted by the store;
• The STORE has previous agreements with one or more
payment systems;
• The HAP owns valid DAA credentials and is able to
run the Setup, Join, and Sign DAA methods;
• The SWPs know the HAP manufacturers (i.e., the
HWVs) and can access their DAA Issuer services;
• (optionally) the STORE trusts the information obtained
by the HWVs through their services (e.g., the informa-
tion about its compromised HAPs).
• (optionally) the involved entities are able to create
secure channels (e.g., through SSL/TLS protocols) satis-
fying confidentiality, data integrity and authentication,
and peer authentication using an agreed symmetric key.
It is worth noting that the functional assumptions just
mentioned are quite similar to the ones presented in 4.1.
However, in this scenario, some entities offer special func-
tionalities and play specific roles with respect to the context
of the DAA protocol here employed:
• The HAP plays the role of the secure hardware plat-
form;
• The End User Device plays the role of the host where
the secure hardware is attached;
• The HWV plays the role of DAA Issuer (i.e., the TPM
manufacturer), thus it maintains the rogue oracle;
• The SWP plays the role of DAA Verifier (i.e., it wants
to authenticate the HAP)
• optionally, also the STORE can play the role of the
verifier (i.e., if it wants to authenticate the HAPs)
4.2.3 Workflow
In the full scenario, before deploying an application onto
a device embedding reconfigurable computing resources,
the HAP executes the DAA-Join protocol in order to be
recognized as a trustworthy device by the HWV. The target
of this phase is to prove to the DAA Issuer that the secure
hardware platform is trustworthy (setup) and to obtain
valid DAA credentials (join).
Fig. 4 shows the workflow for the application deploy-
ment7.
The steps to buy a new application in the full scenario
are the following ones (see Fig. 4).
1) (The EU buys the application) the EU browses the
STORE and decides to buy an application, composed
by a SW and a BS parts, developed by a SWP. The
STORE redirects the user on the PG to complete
the application purchase. If the payment transaction
terminates successfully, the PG informs the STORE.
The STORE starts the procedure to send to the EU the
requested BS.
2) (The STORE notifies SWP of a new customer) the
STORE notifies the SWP that a new customer intend
to buy the application (thus he needs the related BS).
Since the communication does not involves sensitive
data, the STORE and the SWP may also avoid using a
secure channel.
7. Note that, to avoid making a too complex diagram, we have
omitted all the authentication and integrity checks as well as the ac-
knowledgements since they have been already presented in the simple
scenario (and because they represent standard mutual authentication
schemes that use random numbers [49]).
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Nofity
DAACredential
DAASign
DAAVerify → KHAP,pub
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RogueList
SW, {Ks}AIKPUB , {BS}Ks
load({Ks}KHAP,pub , {BS}Ks)
OK/KO
KHAP KHAP
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KPRI,bsn,cnt DAACredential
DAAJoin
DAACredential
Fig. 4. The full scenario workflow. The grey area shows messages exchanged locally in the End User Device, i.e., between the host platform and
the HAP.
3) (The EU sends the SWP its data) During this interaction,
the EU sends the information needed to identify its
HAP, i.e., the DAA Credentials issued by the HWV (the
DAA Issuer) when the DAA-Join was performed. Since
the communication includes sensitive data (such as the
credit card number for the purchase and the idHAP),
the End User Device and the STORE will use a secure
channel that ensures confidentiality, data integrity and
authentication.
4) (HAP authentication and optional key exchange) the
SWP verifies that the customer owns a genuine
HAP by executing the DAA-Verify protocol. To know
whether the HAP is rogue, the SWP connects to the
HWV services to query the “rogue oracle”. If the ver-
ification fails, i.e., the DAA Credentials correspond to
a HAP that is not genuine or they have been marked
as rogue, the protocol is stopped by the SWP. Some
management policies will establish how to deal with
these cases (e.g., ask installation on another platform
or simply stop the purchase). If the verification is
successful then the payment is finalized. We assume
that the interactions between the HAP and the SWP
by means of the DAA protocol allow the exchange of
a public key used by the SWP to encrypt the data,
which will be decrypted only inside the HAP. In case
the RSA-DAA protocol is used, based on the strong
RSA assumption, the DAA Credential already conveys
a certified public key kHAP,pub. In case other public
schemes are used, like the ones based on the qSDH and
the LSRW assumptions or the ECDAA, we assume the
HAP is able to generate an RSA key pair and, via the
DAA Sign, it can send the SWP the signed public key
kHAP,pub.
5) (The SWP sends the EU the encrypted bitstream) the
SWP generates a new symmetric key, the session key
Ks, ciphers it using the received kHAP,pub, then it
ciphers the bitstream with KS . Finally, it sends both
the {Ks}kHAP,pub and {BS}Ks to the STORE8.
6) (The EU downloads the application from the STORE)
finally, the STORE makes available for download to
EU from his account both the software SW, and the
enveloped data structure including {Ks}kHAP,pub and
{BS}Ks .
The EU is then ready to install the application on its End
User Device.
As for the simple scenario, the EU is then ready to install
the application on its device. Every time the End User starts
the application, the HAP is reconfigured with the soft IP
core conveyed with the bitstream. Within the HAP the BS
will be decrypted thanks to the embedded controller that
deciphers the session key ks from {Ks}KHAP,pub by using
the corresponding key KHAP,pri.
5 HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION
In this section we present our proof-of-concept for the
secure bitstream transfer protocol, detailing the proposed
hardware architecture. We consider the End User Device as a
heterogeneous mobile device composed of the host platform
and the Hardware Acceleration Platform, as shown in Fig. 5.
5.1 Architecture
The host platform integrates hardware peripherals com-
mon for mobile computing devices, such as computational
cores (e.g., microprocessors, GPUs, etc.), sensors (e.g., gy-
roscope, accelerometers, proximity sensors, light sensors,
etc.), display or screen, memory and storage (e.g., embedded
memory, RAM, SD card, etc.) and network adapters for
connectivity features. The HAP is embedded into the mobile
device. Within the HAP, there is the reconfigurable resource,
i.e., the FPGA. The HAP embeds also a microcontroller
8. The data sent in this interaction can also be wrapped in a single
enveloped data structure, e.g., the PKCS#7 enveloped data.
11
		FPGAController
idHAP, KHAP
Processor
Configuration
HAP
Host
BS Controls DataI/O
Data	I/O
Storage	Medium
Trusted	Area
Untrusted	Area
End	User	Device
Sensors	and	Peripherals
Fig. 5. The internal architecture of the End User Device
offering cryptographic functionalities, such as key genera-
tions, and to securely load the bitstreams of the applications
installed onto the FPGA.
5.2 Interconnections
The class of mobile devices is often characterized with
components enabling two different types of connections,
i.e., wired and wireless. Network adapters and antenna of
the End User Device enable external connectivity towards
an internet connection, which is necessary for the user to
browse application stores and to download the SW and BS
of the applications to be installed.
Internal connections depend on the actual hardware
architecture of the End User Device. Among the components
of the EU device, the data path of the bitstream spans from
the storage medium to the FPGA within the HAP. In order
to permanently store an application, the host microcon-
troller is connected to the storage medium. The hardware
description of applications is loaded onto the FPGA with
a link between the host and the HAP. Eventually, when
the FPGA has to be programmed the bitstream is moved
to the HAP where the controller decrypts the hardware
configuration and sends it to the FPGA.
5.3 Implementation details
To simulate our architecture, we separated the host from
the HAP of the End User Device. The host device is em-
ulated with a normal laptop/desktop PC connected to the
internet, running the client software. The HAP is connected
to the host PC with a USB cable. For prototyping the
HAP, we employed a particular chip, i.e., SEcube™ [50].
SEcube™ is a heterogeneous system-on-chip, embedding
three components interconnected within the same package:
a microcontroller, an FPGA and a SmartCard. The micro-
controller is a 32-bit low-power ARM Cortex-M4 processor
performing the necessary operations to communicate with
the host, through USB and SDIO interface. To securely
program the FPGA, the microcontroller is connected to
the FPGA through a 16-bit wide bus. The reconfigurable
hardware is a Lattice MachXO2-7000 low-power FPGA. The
SmartCard is Certified Common Criteria CC EAL5+. The
host is connected to the storage medium, i.e., a microSD
card, which is accessible also from the microcontroller of
the HAP. The storage medium is employed to store the
bitstream of the applications downloaded. Although the
BS on the storage medium can be accesible from outside,
it is stored encrypted to avoid confidentiality breaches.
The bitstream is decrypted only within the HAP, which
is considered a trusted area. The other involved parties
STORE, SWP and HWV are represented with other PCs
connected in a network. Each entity executes an application
to communicate with the other network nodes and serves
the respective clients according to the protocols disccussed
in Section 4.
5.4 Software stack
The software executed on the bare metal of the HAP de-
vice is the open source firmware of the SEcube™ SDK.
It provides a high-security abstraction layer through API
functions, ranging from encryption and decryption utilities
to cryptographic keys management for the keys embedded
in the HAP, as well as interfaces for secure communication
with the host platform. To implement the functionalities
required for the DAA protocol of Section 4.2, we adopted the
MIRACL Crypto SDK [51]. The MIRACL SDK is a C/C++
library providing optimized implementations for security
primitives (e.g., elliptic curve cryptography - ECC), tailored
for constrained environments, such as embedded systems
and mobile devices.
Among the applications running on the host side of the
End User Device, the counterpart of the APIs are used to
communicate with the HAP. Also, the host device runs the
client market application, which is able to connect to the ser-
vices offered by the Software Application Stores. The server
applications of the STORE, SWP and HWV resides in the
same PC, working as separate asynchronous processes. The
services of these entities have been emulated as Python3
applications. For the client/server architecture and asyn-
chronous communication functionalities we employed the
asyncio module. The communication among these processes,
running on the same physical machine, flows through differ-
ent port numbers of the communication sockets on the same
IP address. Every message sent is encrypted and signed to
guarantee integrity, confidentiality and authenticity. When
reaching the destination, the signature of the message is
checked against malicious alterations. When the download
of the bitstream is completed, the application running on
the End User Device triggers the mechanism for loading
the bitstream onto the FPGA. The HAP firmware retrieves
the encrypted data from the storage medium and check its
integrity and authenticity. Finally, the bitstream is decrypted
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and the plaintext configuration is loaded onto the FPGA by
the microcontroller equipped onto the HAP.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
From Section 2.3, we see two types of attackers to
counteract: man-in-the-middle (MITM) and man-at-the-end
(MATE) attackers. The implicit assumption in an MITM
scenario is that both the endpoints are trusted entities.
However, this assumption is no longer valid in the case
where also MATE attackers are interested in obtaining the
bitstream. Indeed, MATE attacks are more challenging to
prevent. However, all the security relevant operations are
performed in the HAP, which we assume is a trusted device
that cannot be attacked by our adversaries.
It is worth remarking that the proofs of the security
of these solutions hold under the infeasibility hypothesis.
That is, we assume the use of state-of-the-art secure cryp-
tographic algorithms with proper key lengths. For instance,
currently, a 256-bit security is required from symmetric
encryption, that is, the best attack should be a brute force
attack on a 2256 size key space, i.e., using AES256 guarantees
an appropriate level of security. Furthermore, at least 80-bit
of security is required for the digest algorithms, for instance
SHA-256 is currently a valid choice.
Moreover, we recall that when two communicating peers
A and B share a symmetric key k:
• (confidentiality) only A and B are able decrypt messages
encrypted with k;
• (symmetric integrity and authentication) if A receives a
message and a MAC computed by using k, A deducts
that the message and the MAC were generated by B
and no one changed the original message, analogous
considerations are valid when B receives messages and
MACs A.
6.1 Simple Scenario
MITM attacks performed by remote adversaries represent
a standard security problem in computer networks and
there are provably secure solutions to protect against these
attacks: the channel protection techniques. In fact, MITM
attacks can be neutralized by using strong peer authentica-
tion mechanisms to avoid impersonation, symmetric data
integrity and authentication techniques to avoid the mes-
sage forging and alteration, and symmetric data encryption
to ensure confidentiality of exchanged data.
The techniques we adopted in the simple scenario pro-
tocol ensure data confidentiality by using symmetric en-
cryption algorithms (e.g., AES), and symmetric data in-
tegrity and authentication algorithms (i.e., a keyed digest
or HMAC using a cryptographic hash function) used in the
a “challenge-response (keyed) one-way functions authenti-
cation protocol” [49]. These are well-known approaches that
are provably secure under the infeasibility assumption.
The first step of the protocol for bitstream IP protection
specified in Section 4.1 represents a typical e-commerce sce-
nario very widespread nowadays, where a user is assumed
to have a credit card, a TLS-enabled browser installed in
his environment, and an account on the application store
of the platform. The store relies on payment services that
should adhere to the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI DSS) to work in the financial world [52].
Indeed, the PCI DSS imposes high security requirements
for merchants and payment servers that store, process or
transmit payment cardholder data when implementing a
robust payment card data security process.
By analysing the protocol, we derive that the idHAP is
only readable by the EU, the STORE, the SWP, and the
HWV. In fact, the HAP identifier is encrypted with the key
shared between the client browser and the STORE, then
the STORE encrypts it with the key shared with the SWP.
Finally, idHAP is again encrypted with the key shared with
HWV and it is sent to the HWV. MITM attackers cannot
read the HAP identifier if strong encryption algorithms are
used. Additionally, impersonation attacks are impossible as
the sent messages allow symmetric authentication of the
party. Furthermore, the data authentication and integrity
mechanisms used by the presented protocol (i.e., HMAC or
an authenticated encryption algorithm) prevent that modifi-
cations to exchanged messages are not detected. Therefore,
the only remaining attacks are the DoS attacks, which we
have excluded as it is not among our goals (and not easy to
prevent in all cases).
Even more important, the BS is read in clear only by
the SWP and the HWV. In fact, the bitstream is encrypted
with the key shared between the SWP and the HWV. Then,
the HWV encrypts the BS by using the secret key KHAP,
shared with the HAP of the End User Device. Therefore, no
one but the HAP with the identifier exchanged during the
protocol is able to load and use it. The received bitstream is
stored in an encrypted form until it is moved to the HAP
decrypted and loaded onto the FPGA, while the software
application is usually downloaded in plaintext, since other
software protection techniques are displaced to protect the
intellectual property, if needed. Therefore, MITM and MATE
attacks that aim at reading the bitstream in intelligible way
are avoided.
These considerations prove that only the EUs that
bought the software are able to use the corresponding BS.
Moreover, even the end users are not able to read the
plaintext of the bitstream.
Note that the confidentiality of idHAP and the integrity
and authentication of all messages could be achieved if,
instead of an ad-hoc protocol as in Fig. 3, general purpose
channel protection mechanisms are used. Even better, these
channels usually also provide protection from reply attacks
and filtering, by numbering exchanged packets or by storing
the last packets. The most widespread ones are the TLS
protocol [53], which works at the transport layer of the
ISO/OSI stack, or the IPsec protocol [54], which works at
network layer, and other application layer methods, usually
message protection techniques (e.g., WS-Security). In our
case the TLS approach is the preferred one, which better
integrates with a web-based scenario that is very frequent
in the e-commerce scenarios. Indeed, it does not require
additional software or any previous knowledge of the other
communicating party but limited modifications of the ser-
vices or the availability of an ad hoc API.
On the other hand, there is no alternative than the ex-
plicit encryption with KFPGA to protect the confidentiality
of the bitstream.
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6.2 Advanced Scenario
The advanced scenario falls in the same common e-
commerce use case. We propose an alternative use of DAA
protocol in a more general context than the TCG related
ones. The only difference is that the user is required to per-
form a DAA Setup to initialize the HAP and a DAA Join
before running the protocol to generate and issue new DAA
credentials of the FPGA. From the functional point of view,
DAA-related operations are only available in experimental
settings and have not yet reached a large audience, thus not
to current customers. However, they do not pose significant
challenges for future EUs, also because they can be mostly
automated and their complexity can be properly hidden to
end users.
Indeed, after buying the software, the client is redirected
towards the SWP and he is asked to perform a DAA Sign
to attest the integrity of its HAP. Only the SWP knows the
session key Ks, which is then ciphered with the public key
received by HAP. Therefore,Ks will only be available inside
the HAP, in the trusted part of the protocol entities. This
in turn allows satisfying the “Bitstream confidentiality”,
“Bitstream integrity and authenticity” and “Legitimate End
User” requirements. To complete the integrity verification
the SWP will contact the “rogue oracle”, that is, the entity
knowing the IDs of the compromised HAP. The HWV is the
best (and only, to date) candidate to maintain this list.
Note that the generation of an RSA key pair whose pub-
lic component has to be signed with the DAA Credentials
and then sent Software Provider, is currently not imple-
mented in the TPM chips. However, it is not against the TPM
and DAA specifications, as DAA Sign can be both used for
remote attestation and data signature purposes. Therefore,
from the functional point of view, the operation we require
poses integration issues with current TPM chips but it is
not a problem for possible future versions of the TPM nor
for the secure hardware (FPGA) we are considering for this
paper, as they are fully reconfigurable.
Therefore, in this scenario the only entity that knows the
BS is the SWP, because the HAP can only load and use it
internally. Thus, when following this approach the “Need to
know” principle of the BS is better ensured as it guarantees
that the minimum number of entities know the BS in an
intelligible form. Indeed, as the HAP of the End User is the
only entity that knows the private component of the public
key sent to the SWP, only the HAP of the legitimate buyer
can use the BS, thus ensuring the “Legitimate End User”.
Additionally, by using the DAA Sign and DAA Verify
operations and the remote verification using the rogue or-
acle, the SWP is able to sell its products to buyers whose
HAP is not compromised, thus proving the “Legitimate
HAP” requirement.
Therefore, we can conclude that the security of the
advanced scenario only depends on the correctness and
security of the DAA protocol. We assume that the DAA
protocol used is correct and secure. Given the level of
interest in this protocol and the effort put by the TCG and
the researchers in the field, this is currently a reasonable
assumption and it will become even more acceptable also
in the near future. Indeed, as discussed in Section 4.2.1,
the recent progresses and publications give positive hints
on the fact that the DAA development is converging to a
form that is both secure and not too demanding from the
computational point of view [47], [48].
The idea of using the DAA protocol has major conse-
quences to the impact of the work presented here. Indeed,
the use of a well-known protocol guarantees a bigger control
on the strength of the secure mechanisms. Moreover, there
will be more people researching for flaws, as the impact
of attacks becomes very high thus also the impact of pub-
lication of such attacks is more likely to reach a higher
visibility. Also reactions of the involved parties to potential
flaws would have much more support. The TCG is also
increasingly working to increase anonimity and improve
users’s privacy. In our opinion this is a major trend that
is worth joining.
We reach at the same time a strong protocol that guar-
antees a better level of user privacy (i.e., used data and
hardware identifiers) and minor exposition of the company
IP (soft IP core are only read by developers and used by
secure hardware).
Therefore, even if we do not necessarily propose the use
of TCG-specified TPM chips, we follow the progresses in
this field and re-implement in reconfigurable hardware the
same features.
Another good reason to join a mainstream initiative, is
a greater level of control on the whole supply chain of the
trusted hardware device, being they TPMs of FPGA-based
devices. Indeed, since nothing can be done if the HWV
inserts backdoors in the produced devices, we have to resort
to a trusted supply chain.
Together with simple backdoors to access the content of
the HAP to download the IP cores that need to be protected,
other attacks against the whole End User Platform can be
leveraged by holes in the security of the supposedly trusted
device.
As a simple instance of potential attacks, instead of
generating a new RSA key pair inside the HAP, the HWV
can generate and inject a certain number of RSA key pairs
to choose from (or DAA Credentials if RSA-DAA is used).
Therefore, the HWV would have access to all bitstreams
encrypted with those public keys.
6.3 Physical Attacks
Physical attacks represent another type of possible attacks
performed directly on the End User Device. In this case,
an attacker aiming at finding the symmetric encryption key
must be necessarily a MATE owning the device of interest.
We distinguish the case of non-invasive physical attacks
from invasive physical attacks.
Non-invasive attacks can be partitioned in attacks where
the device is purposely stressed, i.e., active, and attacks where
there is no interaction with it, i.e., passive. In both cases,
the destruction of the device is not necessary. However
they generally require a longer time to be accomplished.
Brute-force attacks have already been excluded under the
infeasibility hypothesis. Side-channel attacks can still be em-
ployed, however they are not always possible and require
specialized equipment. The SEcube™ chip adopted for the
prototype is secure against the differential power analysis
attack as shown in [55]. Timing attacks can be neutralized
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resorting to constant-time implementation of the bitstream
decryption and other security primitives.
Invasive physical attacks destroy the device and require
sophisticated and expensive equipment, knowledgeable at-
tackers, and possibly long time to be carried out.
In our scenarios, a physical attack might target the Host
platform, the HAP or the storage medium. Any attack to the
Host or the storage medium is neutralized with the encryp-
tion algorithm, since these parts of the end user platform
are considered not trusted. Accessing these peripheral will
give to the attacker the possibility to find the ciphertext
of the bitstream. But the data must still be deciphered, by
reversing the key. The HAP is in fact the critical element,
since the bitstream is deciphered within this device through
the key stored here. Local adversaries should first bypass
any external protection to reach the internal circuitry.
If we suppose that an invasive physical attack is success-
ful, only a single device is compromised. Every device stores
a unique serial number and the cryptographic key relative to
the specific device. In this way, an attacker wanting to inject
vulnerabilities or malicious hardware must repeat the attack
on other HAPs. This means that also other devices should
be compromised in the same way, leading to higher costs
to spread the attack. Also, the effort to exploit the attack is
linear with the number of device to compromise.
Nonetheless, if the attack is successful, the target IP
stored onto the device is compromised by only compromis-
ing a single device. Indeed, when the bitstream is available
to the attacker, it can be decrypted and its description
might not remain confidential, but could be disclosed to the
public. Moreover, this security breach gives the possibility
to the attacker to recover also the idHAP of the compromised
device. By knowing this information, an attacker could
also obtain any other bitstream previously bought for that
specific device.
Note that if a TPM chip supports the DAA protocol fea-
tures, this chip is protected by design against side-channel
(timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic
leaks) and physical attacks. Additionally, as it uses crypto-
graphic operations it must comply the FIPS 140-2 standard.
The TPMs available on the market provide memory
curtaining and protected execution to avoid that the MATE
reads the stored secrets. Therefore, the only way to read
the secrets is physically tampering with the chip. To the
best of authors’ knowledge, the only successful physical
attack is the one presented at the Black Hat conference
2010 [56]. At cost of six months and 200,000$, Tarnovsky
tampered the internal circuitry of an Infineon TPM of the
SLE 66PE family of contactless interface microcontrollers to
get the secrets. The attack required to dissolve the outer
shell with chemicals and remove the layers of mesh wiring
to access the chip’s bus to read the secrets by tapping the
communications channels using small needles. The attack
was defined by the author “not easy to duplicate” and
the Trusted Computing Group that issued the TPM speci-
fications, a bit more optimistically, “exceedingly difficult to
replicate in a real-world environment”.
Some other attacks to the TPM are known in literature
that are not important for us. The reset attack, is a method
to reset the TPM without resetting the entire system. In
this way the known-good hashes can be stored in the TPM
circumventing the “extend-only” functionality that does not
allow to overwrite values in the TPM registers. This attack
is mounted against TPM family 1.1 using a vulnerability
of the Low Pin Count (LPC) bus that allows to reset all the
attached devices. From the family 1.2 this attack is no longer
possible.
Another reset attack is presented in [57], however the
authors already contributed together with manufactures
with a patch to solve the vulnerabilities.
A recent side channel attack on TPM 2.0 devices is
presented in [58], where the authors are able to recover 256-
bit private keys for ECDSA signatures Intel firmware-based
TPM as well as a hardware TPM. The attack exploits timing
information leakage and allows key recovery in less than
two minutes. Also in these case, the vulnerabilities have
been solved.
7 CONCLUSION
This work addresses the protection of soft IP cores to be
deployed in the context of mobile heterogeneous systems.
We provide an architecture for a secure transfer of a soft
IP core bitstream from a generic software developer to an
end user owning a device equipped with reconfigurable
logic, considering a common real-world scenario of mobile
application market.
The provided protocol details the deployment for two
scenarios, considering first a minimum set of security re-
quirements, then an advanced scenario fulfilling tighter
security properties.
We guarante that only legitimate users purchasing a le-
gitimate copy of an application are enabled to use it. During
the deployment, we are able to maintain the confidentiality
of the intellectual property. Also, the integrity of the data
transferred is preserved to guarantee that no alteration,
whether malicious or not, has been performed. Compliance
to these requirements protects from MITM attackers. We
considered the threat of MATE attackers as well. Finally
we also provided a prototype implementation of the whole
architecture, employing a system-on-chip as heterogeneous
system to work together with a host device (e.g., a PC, or a
mobile device).
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